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The Political Economy of Highway Tolling: Global Lessons, African Experience and Scenarios for Kenya

Toll roads promise new infrastructure without new public debt, yet they are among the most contested policies in transport. Evidence from five continents shows that success depends less on engineering than on contracts, transparency and public consent.

By AFRIHECOM Research Team24 October 202611 min read

Illustration: AFRIHECOM. An electronic toll gantry over a highway: the technology is simple, the political bargain is not.

55%
of Latin American transport PPP contracts signed in 1980–2000 were renegotiated, on average after 3.1 years
Guasch, via ITF 2014
40%
peak payment compliance for Gauteng’s e-tolls, against about 85% needed; e-tolling ended in 2024
Daily Maverick, 2018; BusinessTech, 2024
67,298
average daily vehicles on the Nairobi Expressway in FY2024/25
The Star, citing official PPP data, 2026

Key takeaways

  • Toll concessions are frequently renegotiated; Chile’s highways averaged 4.2 renegotiations each.[4][5]
  • Demand risk often returns to the state, as Mexico’s 1997 rescue and Korea’s guarantees show.[7][8]
  • Gauteng’s e-tolls failed on compliance and consent, while India scaled electronic tolling successfully.[12][16]
  • Across Africa, tolling has been abolished, reintroduced, bought back and renegotiated.[24][25][22][21]
  • Kenya is moving to user-pays tolling on major corridors; indexation, alternatives and disclosure will shape acceptance.[41][52]

Highway tolling sits at the intersection of infrastructure finance and public consent. For governments, tolls can unlock private capital and link payment to use. For road users, they are a visible, recurring charge on something many regard as a public good. The history of tolling is therefore a history of negotiation: between governments and investors over risk, and between governments and citizens over legitimacy. This article draws on international and African evidence to identify what determines whether tolling succeeds, and sets out illustrative scenarios for Kenya.

Why tolls are contested

Tolls are unusually visible. Unlike fuel taxes, they are paid at a specific place, for a specific road, often to a named private operator. Research by the International Transport Forum shows that polls taken before a scheme starts are not a reliable guide to acceptance, that perceived distributional impacts are a significant factor, and that how revenue is used, and the investment package it funds, strongly shapes acceptance.[1] Stockholm’s congestion charge was reintroduced permanently in 2007 after a 2006 trial and referendum; support rose from 36% before the trial to over 70% by 2013.[2][3]

Global lessons: contracts, risk and renegotiation

The most consistent finding in the international literature is that toll concessions are frequently renegotiated. Guasch’s research found that 55% of Latin American transport PPP contracts signed between 1980 and 2000 were renegotiated, on average 3.1 years after signature.[4] In Chile, often cited as a model, highway concessions were renegotiated on average 4.2 times each between 1993 and 2007, with renegotiated amounts equal to about 26% of total highway investment (about 35% of the originally budgeted amount); across all concessions, about 83% of the additional amounts were granted through bilateral renegotiation without external scrutiny.[5] Economists Engel, Fischer and Galetovic proposed a remedy: present-value-of-revenue auctions, in which the concession ends once a fixed amount of revenue has been collected, automatically adjusting the term to actual demand.[6]

When traffic falls short, risks can return to the state. Mexico rescued 23 of its 52 toll road concessions in 1997; the debt assumed grew from about MXN 58 billion at the time to about MXN 178 billion by 2006.[7] Korea paid about KRW 915 billion over seven years under minimum revenue guarantees for six projects before abolishing them in 2009.[8] The reverse problem also occurs: France’s competition authority found in 2014 that motorway concessionaires privatised in 2006 earned net profitability of 20–24% of turnover in 2013, comparable to a guaranteed income.[9] The Indiana Toll Road, leased for US$3.8 billion in 2006, saw its concessionaire enter bankruptcy in 2014 before the concession was resold in 2015 for US$5.7 billion.[10]

The decisive question in tolling is rarely the toll rate. It is who carries the risk when traffic, currencies or politics change.

When public consent fails: Gauteng

South Africa’s Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project is the most instructive failure on the continent. Open-road electronic tolling began in December 2013,[11] but compliance peaked at about 40% in June 2014 and fell to 29% by 2017, against an estimated 85% needed for viability.[12] In 2022, the government announced that e-toll debt would be split 70% to national government and 30% to Gauteng province, and e-tolling ended on 11 April 2024.[13][14] The lesson is not that electronic tolling cannot work, but that it depends on enforcement, registry quality and public acceptance established before launch.

Figure 1

Gauteng’s e-tolls never reached the compliance they needed

Share of road users paying e-tolls, compared with estimated viability thresholds (%)

Peak complianceJune 2014
40%
Compliance2017
29%
Threshold for viabilitycivil society estimate
85%
Achievable, per SANRALcourt submission
93%
Source: Daily Maverick 2018, citing OUTA and SANRAL.[12] E-tolling began in December 2013. The government announced in 2022 that e-toll debt would be split 70% national and 30% provincial, and e-tolling ended in April 2024.[11][13][14]
View the data as a table
Measure%
Peak compliance (Jun 2014)40
Compliance (2017)29
Viability threshold (OUTA)85
Achievable (SANRAL claim)93

India offers the counterpoint. National highway toll collections rose from about Rs 27,900 crore in FY2021 to Rs 70,278 crore in FY2026, with more than 98% now collected electronically through FASTag.[15][16][17]

Figure 2

India shows how electronic tolling can scale revenue

National highway toll collections, Rs crore

FY2021
27,927
FY2022
33,929
FY2023
48,032
FY2024
55,882
FY2025
61,408
FY2026
70,278
Sources: Ministry of Road Transport and Highways replies to Parliament, via Swarajya.[15][16] More than 98% of national highway user fees are now collected through FASTag electronic tags.[17] Growth also reflects network expansion: operational plazas rose from 733 (FY2022) to 1,209 (FY2026).
View the data as a table
YearRs crore
FY202127,927
FY202233,929
FY202348,032
FY202455,882
FY202561,408
FY202670,278

The African experience

Africa’s toll roads illustrate the full range of outcomes. The N4 Maputo Development Corridor, a 30-year cross-border concession from 1997, was financed without government subsidy, though the two governments guaranteed the concessionaire’s debt.[18] Senegal’s Dakar–Diamniadio motorway, the first greenfield toll PPP in sub-Saharan Africa outside South Africa, cut commuting times but faced disputes between the state and the concessionaire;[19] a 2021 amendment gave the state a 25% stake, froze toll indexation to the end of 2025 and extended the concession to 2044.[20][21] In Lagos, amid public resistance to a second toll plaza and disputes over costs and toll increases, the state bought back the Lekki–Epe concession in 2013.[22] The Lekki toll plaza later became the site where soldiers and police opened fire on #EndSARS protesters in October 2020, a reminder of how symbolically charged toll infrastructure can become.[23]

Policy has also swung. Ghana announced the abolition of all tolls on public roads and bridges in its November 2021 budget,[24] then in July 2026 approved a 20-year PPP to introduce electronic free-flow tolling, with 70% of gross revenue to government and 30% to the operator.[25] Nigeria resumed federal tolling in February 2025 on the Abuja–Keffi–Akwanga–Makurdi highway, with discounts for frequent users such as commercial light vehicles.[26] Uganda’s Entebbe Expressway, tolled since 2022, has generated revenue below the projections in its loan agreement, and a parliamentary committee report in August 2026 recommended terminating the toll operations contract and forensic audits.[27] Ethiopia’s Addis–Adama Expressway shows the revenue cost of free alternatives: much traffic stayed on the old road.[28]

Figure 3

Africa’s tolling experience: a pattern of contestation and renegotiation

Selected toll roads and toll policies in Africa

Project or policyDesignPolitical and fiscal outcome
N4 Maputo Corridor (South Africa–Mozambique)30-year cross-border concession from 1997No government subsidy, though governments guaranteed debt; Mozambique reviewing future ahead of expiry
Dakar–Diamniadio (Senegal)First greenfield toll PPP in sub-Saharan Africa outside South Africa; opened 20132021 renegotiation: state took 25% stake, indexation frozen to end-2025, term extended to 2044
Lekki–Epe (Nigeria)30-year BOT signed 2006; tolling from 2011Resistance to a second plaza and cost disputes; Lagos State bought back the concession in 2013
Federal tolls (Nigeria)Abolished in 2004; resumed February 2025N500 per car; 50% discount for frequent users; first of nine planned toll plazas on the Abuja–Keffi–Akwanga–Makurdi highway
National tolls (Ghana)Abolition of all tolls announced November 2021July 2026: Parliament approved a 20-year PPP for electronic free-flow tolling, 70/30 split of gross revenue
Entebbe Expressway (Uganda)Tolling since 2022Revenue below loan-agreement projections; 2026 parliamentary committee report recommended contract termination and audits
Addis–Adama Expressway (Ethiopia)Opened 2014Revenue short of expectations as much traffic stayed on the free road
Henri Konan Bédié Bridge (Côte d’Ivoire)30-year concession, opened 2014500 FCFA per car, with the State subsidising 50% of the car tariff
Sources: PPIAF; Club of Mozambique 2025; Eiffage 2021; BusinessDay 2013; FMINO 2025; Citi Newsroom 2021; GBC 2026; Daily Monitor 2026; AidData; Bouygues 2014; Abidjan.net 2014.[18][29][20][21][22][26][24][25][27][28][30]

Kenya: tolling enters the mainstream

Kenya’s first major toll road, the Nairobi Expressway, is a 27.1 km road built by China Road and Bridge Corporation and operated by its subsidiary Moja Expressway under a 30-year concession (three years of construction and 27 of operation), with operations from 2022.[31] Tolls are adjusted for the shilling–dollar exchange rate and inflation under a formula in the project agreement.[32] When the full-trip car toll rose from Sh360 to Sh500 in January 2024, the then roads minister attributed the increase to the shilling’s depreciation, stating that the formula was embedded in the agreement and that the government had not given a traffic volume guarantee.[32][33] The highways authority later advised lowering tolls as the shilling strengthened and inflation eased; the advisory was not implemented.[34] Traffic has grown strongly, to an average of 67,298 vehicles a day in FY2024/25, up from about 59,000 two years earlier, according to official PPP data.[35] Treasury has disclosed a termination fee of Sh103.76 billion payable if the 27-year deal is terminated prematurely.[36]

Figure 4

Nairobi Expressway: revenue has grown since opening

Toll revenue reported by the operator’s parent company, RMB million

2023
200
2024≈Sh6.1bn
323
2025≈Sh7.7bn
406
Source: The Star, citing China Communications Construction Company filings for revenue and official PPP data for traffic.[35] Average daily traffic was 67,298 vehicles in FY2024/25. Other published figures for traffic and revenue differ, reflecting different periods and entities.
View the data as a table
YearRMB million
2023200
2024323
2025406

The politics have been complex. During the 2022 campaign, then Deputy President William Ruto said of the Nairobi Expressway, “You don’t charge people for using the road,” proposing to recover costs through taxes on goods instead.[37] Legal challenges to the Expressway were dismissed in 2023 because petitioners had not exhausted available dispute resolution mechanisms.[38] In August 2024, the highways authority said it was considering a tolling policy that could cover several existing roads; Nairobi Senator Edwin Sifuna criticised the proposal, saying tolls should apply only to new roads.[39]

The Rironi–Mau Summit highway marks a new phase. After an earlier Vinci-led PPP was cancelled (reported in 2024),[40] the government adopted a user-pays toll model, with privately initiated proposals from two consortia.[41][42] Treasury argues that the old model would have required about Ksh23 billion a year in state payments and that the new model saves an estimated Ksh76.2 billion.[41] A toll of Sh8 per km has been announced for the 233 km scheme, which includes the Rironi–Maai Mahiu–Naivasha link, with the winning bid reported to include 1% annual escalation.[43][44] According to Treasury and the PPP Directorate, the minimum revenue guarantee was removed and investors bear demand risk,[45] with the government receiving 60% of revenue above an agreed 16% equity return.[41] Treasury’s 2026 Budget Policy Statement also lists low traffic and revenue shortfalls on the corridor among fiscal risks that could require compensation to investors.[46] Motorists’ and consumer groups have filed court petitions challenging the tolls,[47] and early works on the Rironi–Naivasha section were about 35% complete by the end of September 2026.[48]

On the coast route, the PPP Committee in July 2025 abandoned a privately initiated proposal for a new Nairobi–Mombasa expressway and asked for it to be restructured as an expansion of the existing highway; by July 2026 the government was planning a tolled four-lane upgrade.[49]

Figure 5

Kenya’s toll rates: existing and proposed

Toll per kilometre for light vehicles, Kenya shillings (derived where noted)

Nairobi ExpresswaySh500 full trip ÷ 27.1 km (operator notice, Jan 2024; derived)
≈Sh18.5/km
Nairobi–Mombasa proposalall motorists; abandoned July 2025
Sh12–13/km
Rironi–Mau Summit (A8)announced June 2026
Sh8/km
Sources: Kenyans.co.ke 2024; AidData; Business Daily 2025; KeNHA via Citizen Digital 2026; The Star 2025.[32][31][50][43][44] The Expressway figure is AFRIHECOM’s calculation for a car travelling the full length; per-km rates on an urban elevated road and an intercity highway are not directly comparable.
View the data as a table
RoadToll
Nairobi ExpresswaySh500 full trip (≈Sh18.5/km, derived)
Nairobi–Mombasa (abandoned proposal)Sh12–13/km
Rironi–Mau Summit (A8)Sh8/km

Kenya’s legal and policy framework

The Public Private Partnerships Act 2021 caps concessions at 30 years, extendable with approval, makes upside sharing mandatory and allows the PPP Directorate to initiate but not unilaterally impose renegotiation.[51] A reviewed Draft Tolling Policy published in 2025 would allow tolls mainly on new, improved or higher-standard roads (and on other roads where a clear rationale exists), require collection costs below 15% of revenue, set an indicative threshold of 5,000 vehicles a day, update tariffs quarterly for inflation, and propose a National Tolling Authority, with a directorate in a roads agency in the interim. Notably, it would not require a dedicated toll-free alternative route.[52]

Illustrative scenarios for Kenya

Drawing on the evidence above, three broad pathways can be distinguished. They are illustrative framings to support discussion, not predictions.

Figure 6

Three illustrative scenarios for tolling in Kenya

Hypothetical framings based on public evidence; these are not forecasts

ScenarioWhat it involvesConditions for acceptanceMain risks
A. Corridor-by-corridor user-paysTolls limited to new or upgraded PPP corridors with free alternativesTransparent indexation that moves both ways; court rulings; disclosure of contractsDemand shortfalls becoming contingent liabilities; termination costs
B. Tolling existing roadsTolls extended to existing high-standard roads under a national tolling policyCredible free-flow enforcement; visible earmarking; targeted discountsHigh political salience; low compliance (as in Gauteng); legal challenges
C. Renegotiate and rebalancePolitical or currency shocks prompt renegotiation of tariffs or termsClear renegotiation rules under the PPP Act; independent reviewFiscal cost of concessions; precedent for future contracts
Scenarios: AFRIHECOM, drawing on the international and African experience reviewed in this article.

Design lessons

  1. Disclose contracts and modelsOpacity fuels opposition. Publishing concession terms, traffic forecasts and tariff formulas builds legitimacy and invites scrutiny before problems arise.
  2. Make indexation symmetric and predictableFormulas that raise tolls when currencies weaken must be seen to lower them when currencies strengthen.
  3. Preserve genuine alternativesFree routes reduce equity concerns and legal risk, even if they lower toll revenue, as Ethiopia’s experience shows.
  4. Invest in enforcement before launchElectronic free-flow tolling works where vehicle registries and enforcement are reliable; Gauteng shows the cost when they are not.
  5. Govern renegotiationIndependent review of contract changes, as recommended by Chilean experience, protects the public interest.
  6. Measure and disclose fiscal exposureGuarantees, termination fees and demand risk should be quantified and published as contingent liabilities.

Tolling can mobilise private finance for roads that would otherwise wait decades. But its success is ultimately political: it requires a durable bargain between users, investors and the state. The countries that have struck that bargain did so through transparency, fair risk-sharing and visible benefits for those who pay.

References

  1. International Transport Forum. The Social Impacts of Road Pricing, Roundtable Report 170. OECD/ITF; 2018. itf-oecd.org
  2. IBTTA. Congestion pricing trial shows seeing is believing (Stockholm). ibtta.org
  3. Wikipedia. Stockholm congestion tax. wikipedia.org
  4. Guasch JL, Benitez D, Portabales I, Flor L. The Renegotiation of PPP Contracts: An Overview of its Recent Evolution in Latin America. ITF Discussion Paper 2014-18. OECD/ITF; 2014. itf-oecd.org
  5. Fischer R. The Promise and Peril of Public-Private Partnerships: Lessons from the Chilean Experience. International Growth Centre Working Paper; 2011. theigc.org
  6. Engel E, Fischer R, Galetovic A. Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising. NBER Working Paper 6689; 1998 (published in Journal of Political Economy 2001;109(5):993–1020). nber.org
  7. Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas Públicas, Cámara de Diputados. El rescate carretero (CEFP/016/2007). March 2007. cefp.gob.mx; Carpintero S, Gómez-Ibáñez JA. Mexico’s private toll road program reconsidered. Transport Policy. 2011;18(6). hks.harvard.edu
  8. Korea Times. Profit guarantee abolished for private highways. 8 November 2009. koreatimes.co.kr
  9. Autorité de la concurrence. Opinion 14-A-13 on the motorway concession sector. 17 September 2014. autoritedelaconcurrence.fr
  10. US Federal Highway Administration. Project profile: Indiana Toll Road. fhwa.dot.gov
  11. Wikipedia. E-toll (South Africa). wikipedia.org
  12. Daily Maverick. E-tolls: Makhura admits system failure, will engage Ramaphosa on new funding model. 27 February 2018. dailymaverick.co.za
  13. IOL Business Report. MTBPS 2022: Government to take on a significant portion of R47bn e-toll debt. 26 October 2022. iol.co.za
  14. BusinessTech. E-tolls to officially end next month. March 2024. businesstech.co.za
  15. Swarajya. India’s national highway toll collection surges past Rs 61,000 crore in FY25 (MoRTH reply to Rajya Sabha). 12 February 2026. swarajyamag.com
  16. Swarajya. India’s highway toll collections more than double from Rs 33,929 crore in FY22 to Rs 70,278 crore in FY26. 30 July 2026. swarajyamag.com
  17. Times Drive. FASTag accounts for over 98 percent of toll collection on national highways: MoRTH. 30 January 2026. timesdrive.in
  18. PPIAF. Toolkit case study: South Africa–Mozambique N4 Maputo Development Corridor. ppiaf.org
  19. Le360 Afrique. Sénégal: collision en vue entre l’Etat et le concessionnaire autoroutier Eiffage. 1 August 2018. le360.ma
  20. PPIAF. Senegal: Dakar–Diamniadio toll highway (impact story). May 2015. ppiaf.org
  21. Eiffage. Eiffage and Senegal sign an amendment to the concession agreement for the Autoroute de l’Avenir motorway. December 2021. eiffage.com
  22. BusinessDay. Lekki-Epe Expressway buy-back: in whose interest? August 2013. businessday.ng
  23. Human Rights Watch. Nigeria: Officials indicted for abuses against protesters. 19 November 2021. hrw.org
  24. Citi Newsroom. No more tolls on all public roads: Finance Minister. 17 November 2021. citinewsroom.com
  25. GBC. Parliament approves road toll PPP. 31 July 2026. gbcghanaonline.com
  26. Federal Ministry of Information and National Orientation. FG commences tolling operations on Abuja–Keffi–Akwanga–Makurdi highway. February 2025. fmino.gov.ng
  27. Daily Monitor. Entebbe Expressway toll revenue rises to Shs4b a month. 25 August 2026. monitor.co.ug; Daily Monitor. Parliament demands cancellation of Entebbe Expressway toll contract over alleged revenue leakages. August 2026. monitor.co.ug
  28. AidData. Addis Ababa–Adama Expressway (project record). aiddata.org
  29. Club of Mozambique. Mozambique: Commission to assess future of N4 highway – TRAC’s concession expires in two years. 4 June 2025. clubofmozambique.com
  30. Bouygues Construction. Inauguration of the Henri Konan Bédié bridge (press release). 16 December 2014. bouygues-construction.com; Abidjan.net. Pont HKB: le péage fixé à 500 FCFA. 24 December 2014. abidjan.net
  31. AidData. Nairobi Expressway (project record). aiddata.org
  32. Kenyans.co.ke. Nairobi Expressway announces new charges (Moja Expressway notice). January 2024. kenyans.co.ke
  33. The Kenya Times. Murkomen breaks down reasons govt increased Expressway fees. 2 January 2024. thekenyatimes.com
  34. Business Daily. Why minister ignored advice to cut Nairobi Expressway toll fees. 24 February 2025. businessdailyafrica.com
  35. The Star. Nairobi Expressway revenue climbs as traffic fuels Chinese operator (citing CCCC filings). 9 September 2026. the-star.co.ke
  36. Business Daily. Treasury discloses Sh103bn Expressway termination fee. 10 December 2025. businessdailyafrica.com
  37. Kenyans.co.ke. We won’t charge Kenyans using expressways, says DP Ruto. July 2022. kenyans.co.ke
  38. Business Daily. Court dismisses case seeking to halt Nairobi Expressway. 29 October 2023. businessdailyafrica.com
  39. The Star. Sifuna questions KeNHA’s proposal to toll roads. 14 August 2024. the-star.co.ke
  40. Business Daily. Kenya cancels France-backed Mau Summit toll highway contract. 30 April 2024. businessdailyafrica.com
  41. Kenyans.co.ke. Treasury defends toll-based Nairobi–Nakuru–Mau Summit highway deal after scrapping original contract. July 2026. kenyans.co.ke
  42. Kenya National Highways Authority. Disclosure notice: A8 and A8 South PPP road project. July 2025. kenha.co.ke
  43. Citizen Digital. KeNHA sets Ksh8 per kilometre toll fee on Rironi–Mau Summit road. 24 June 2026. citizen.digital
  44. The Star. Motorists to get free option on Rironi–Mau Summit highway. 28 October 2025. the-star.co.ke
  45. Eastleigh Voice. Taxpayers spared from investor losses under Rironi–Mau Summit toll road deal. 12 July 2026. eastleighvoice.co.ke
  46. Business Daily. Treasury flags risk of paying investors if toll highways suffer. 15 February 2026. businessdailyafrica.com
  47. Bizna Kenya. Motorists move to court over Rironi–Mau Summit toll highway. November 2025. biznakenya.com; Kenyans.co.ke. COFEK moves to court to stop Ksh8/km Nairobi–Mau Summit toll. July 2026. kenyans.co.ke
  48. Kenyans.co.ke. KeNHA seeks firm to verify Rironi–Mau Summit project costs. 23 October 2026. kenyans.co.ke
  49. Kenya National Highways Authority. Disclosure notice: Nairobi–Mombasa Expressway PPP Committee decision. July 2025. kenha.co.ke; Business Daily. Kenya drops US firm, plans 4-lane Nairobi–Mombasa road. 20 July 2026. businessdailyafrica.com
  50. Business Daily. Toll charges for Nairobi–Mombasa expressway revealed. 5 May 2025. businessdailyafrica.com
  51. Bowmans. Kenya: PPP Directorate to become the key driver of PPP projects in Kenya – a detailed look at Kenya’s new PPP law. bowmanslaw.com
  52. Ministry of Roads and Transport. Reviewed Draft Tolling Policy 2025. March 2025. transport.go.ke

Figures are reported as published by each source; several Kenyan figures differ between sources and are presented as reported. Scenarios are illustrative, not forecasts. This article draws only on publicly available information.

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